"Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-pool Resource Experiment"

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorDe Geest, Lawrence R.
dc.contributor.authorKingsley, David C.
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-06T20:13:00Z
dc.date.available2022-04-06T20:13:00Z
dc.date.issued2020-03
dc.description.abstractWe test the effect of inequality on peer punishment in a common-pool resource (CPR) experiment with equal endowments (Equal) or unequal endowments (Unequal). Peer punishment reduces extractions in both treatments, but it is more effective in Unequal. Subjects with lower endowments coordinated around an Equal Earnings norm, subjects with higher endowments matched, and peer punishment tightened this coordinate-and-match dynamic. By contrast, there was less coordination in Equal, and as a result, more peer punishment and lower payoffs.en_US
dc.identifier.citationInequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-pool Resource Experiment by De Geest, Lawrence R. Suffolk University and Kingsley, David C. University of Massachusetts Lowell, March 2020.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12517/236
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWorking Paperen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP;3022
dc.subjectInequality; Common-Pool Resources; Cooperation; Peer Punishmenten_US
dc.title"Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-pool Resource Experiment"en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
WP3022_kingsley_inequality_full_tcm18-331687.pdf
Size:
1.72 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download

Collections

Department of Economics Working Papers