The Role of Media in the Repression-Protest Nexus: A Game-theoretic Model
Date
2015
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
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Publisher
Sage
Abstract
Idealized independent media function as ‘‘watchdogs.’’ Indeed, human rights nongovernmental
organizations have argued that media freedom will improve human
rights. This makes sense intuitively, yet recent formal and empirical studies show
that the effect of independent media varies across regime types. We explore the
relationship among media, government, and citizen protest movements and employ
a game-theoretic model to investigate how the equilibria vary depending on regime
type and media independence. In terms of equilibrium, we find that media watchdogging
is most active in autocracies (and not in democracies), especially when the
government’s perceived capability to repress public protest is declining. Uncertainty
about the government’s ability to repress plays a central role in accounting for the
manifestation of media watchdogging in conjunction with public protest. Illustrations
from Tunisia and North Korea are provided to highlight equilibria derived from the
formal model that vary as a product of perceptions about the government’s ability to
repress.
Description
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Keywords
media, protest, game theory, repression, democracy, freedom of the press, repression and dissent
Citation
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015) 59:6, 1017-1042